Difference between revisions of "Boskalis"

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     | title =
     | title =
     | label6= Emissions (Scope  1&2)
     | label6= Emissions (Scope  1&2)
     | data6 = 1.078 Megatons of CO2 (2021)
     | data6 = 1.078 megatonnes of CO2 (2021)
     | title =  
     | title =  
    | label7= NCI assessment
    | data7 = Very low
     | title =  
     | title =  
     | label7= Total Revenue  
     | label8= Total Revenue  
     | data7 = EUR 2.957 million (2021)
     | data8 = EUR 2.957 million (2021)
     | label8= Stock Exchange
     | label9= Stock Exchange
     | data8 = Amsterdam (Euronext)
     | data9 = Amsterdam (Euronext)
     | label9= Key People
     | label10= Key People
     | data9 = Peter Berdowski (CEO), Carlo van Noort (CFO)
     | data10 = Peter Berdowski (CEO), Carlo van Noort (CFO)
     | title =
     | title =
     | label10= Number of employees  
     | label11= Number of employees  
     | data10 = 10,250 (2021)
     | data11 = 10,250 (2021)
     | label11= Subsidiaries
     | label12= Subsidiaries
     | data11 = {{plainlist|
     | data12 = {{plainlist|
* Among others,
* Among others,
* Boskalis Dragamex
* Boskalis Dragamex
Line 75: Line 77:


== Company Structure ==
== Company Structure ==
In 1971 the company went to the stock market and became a public company.<ref name="Goey">Goey, F. de. (2011). B. Bouwens, K. Sluyterman, Verdiept verleden. Een eeuw Koninklijke Boskalis Westminster en de Nederlandse baggerindustrie. BMGN - Low Countries Historical Review, 126(3), 132–133. https://doi.org/10.18352/bmgn-lchr.7414</ref> Present day, HAL Investments BV is by far Boskalis’ biggest shareholder owning just over 45% of the share.<ref name="An 2021">Boskalis. (2021). Boskalis annual report 2021. Retrieved from https://boskalis.com/</ref> In March 2022, the investment company announced that they want to take over Boskalis.<ref>Smit, M. (2022, March 10). Investeerder HAL wil baggeraar Boskalis overnemen. RTL Nieuws. Retrieved from https://www.rtlnieuws.nl/economie/bedrijven/artikel/5293783/investeerder-hal-overname-baggeraar-boskalis-42-miljard-euro</ref> According to HAL, Boskalis is better off as a private company. Boskalis is examining the bid.  
In 1971 the company went to the stock market and became a public company.<ref name="Goey">Goey, F. de. (2011). B. Bouwens, K. Sluyterman, Verdiept verleden. Een eeuw Koninklijke Boskalis Westminster en de Nederlandse baggerindustrie. BMGN - Low Countries Historical Review, 126(3), 132–133. https://doi.org/10.18352/bmgn-lchr.7414</ref> Present day, HAL Investments BV is by far Boskalis’ biggest shareholder owning just over 45% of the share.<ref name="An 2021">Boskalis. (2022). Boskalis annual report 2021. Retrieved from https://boskalis.com/reports.html</ref> In March 2022, the investment company announced that they want to take over Boskalis.<ref>Smit, M. (2022, March 10). Investeerder HAL wil baggeraar Boskalis overnemen. RTL Nieuws. Retrieved from https://www.rtlnieuws.nl/economie/bedrijven/artikel/5293783/investeerder-hal-overname-baggeraar-boskalis-42-miljard-euro</ref> According to HAL, Boskalis is better off as a private company. Boskalis is examining the bid.  


Boskalis has a history of expanding to the foreign market and of diversification by providing different services. These strategies did not turn out to be a success. At the beginning of the 80s, the company was almost bankrupt. By focusing again on dredging and selling all the services that did not have anything to do with that, the company could survive.  
Boskalis has a history of expanding to the foreign market and of diversification by providing different services. These strategies did not turn out to be a success. At the beginning of the 80s, the company was almost bankrupt. By focusing again on dredging and selling all the services that did not have anything to do with that, the company could survive.  
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=== Accountant ===
=== Accountant ===
From the 2022 financial year on, KPMG is Boskalis’ auditor.<ref>Boskalis. (2021, March 31). AGM 12 May 2021 agenda. Retrieved from https://boskalis.com/ir/corporate-governance/general-meeting-of-shareholders.html</ref> Before, the external auditor was Ernst & Young Accountants LLP (EY), but the maximum term of appointment has expired. KPMG and Ernst & Young are together with PwC and Deloitte the ‘Big Four’.<ref>Awater, F., Kalkman, P., Koopman, E. & Staal, T. (2016, March 9). Het toezichtsprookje. De Groene Amsterdammer. Retrieved on https://www.groene.nl/artikel/het-toezichtsprookje.</ref> These multinationals are responsible for 60 percent of the mandatory audits in the Netherlands. Of the market listed companies, they even have nine out of ten as clients. KPMG has a history of flaws.   
From the 2022 financial year on, KPMG is Boskalis’ auditor.<ref>Boskalis. (2021, March 31). AGM 12 May 2021 agenda. Retrieved from https://boskalis.com/ir/corporate-governance/general-meeting-of-shareholders.html</ref> Before, the external auditor was Ernst & Young Accountants LLP (EY), but the maximum term of appointment has expired. KPMG and Ernst & Young are together with PwC and Deloitte the ‘Big Four’.<ref>Awater, F., Kalkman, P., Koopman, E. & Staal, T. (2016, March 9). Het toezichtsprookje. De Groene Amsterdammer. Retrieved on https://www.groene.nl/artikel/het-toezichtsprookje.</ref> These multinationals are responsible for 60 percent of the mandatory audits in the Netherlands. Of the market listed companies, they even have nine out of ten as clients. KPMG has a history of flaws.   
In the annual report of 2021, climate-related risks and the energy transition are mentioned in the report of EY. However, the assessment of these risks did not lead to a key audit matter.<ref name="An 2021" /> 


=== Main Activity ===
=== Main Activity ===
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=== Government ===  
=== Government ===  
Rijkswaterstaat was and still is an important commissioning party for Boskalis.<ref name="Goey" /> Rijkswaterstaat is part of the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management and in charge of the design, construction, management and maintenance of the main infrastructure facilities in the Netherlands.<ref>Rijkswaterstaat. (n.d.) About us. Retrieved on 11 April, 2022 from https://www.rijkswaterstaat.nl/en/about-us </ref> Boskalis has a long history of becoming less dependent on Rijkswaterstaat. In doing so, it entered the foreign market with varying success.  
Rijkswaterstaat was and still is an important commissioning party for Boskalis.<ref name="Goey" /> Rijkswaterstaat is part of the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management and in charge of the design, construction, management and maintenance of the main infrastructure facilities in the Netherlands.<ref>Rijkswaterstaat. (n.d.) About us. Retrieved on 11 April, 2022 from https://www.rijkswaterstaat.nl/en/about-us </ref> Boskalis has a long history of becoming less dependent on Rijkswaterstaat. In doing so, it entered the foreign market with varying success.  
The undertaking of projects in the foreign market has a higher risk of non-payment by clients.<ref>Hazekamp, N., Ten Kate, G., Wiertsema, W. & Wilde-Ramsing, J. (2016). Dredging in the Dark. An analysis of the Dutch dredging industry’s failure to identify, prevent, and mitigate adverse impacts in dredging the Suez canal. Both Ends and SOMO. Retrieved from <nowiki>https://www.bothends.org/nl/Actueel/Publicaties/Dredging-in-the-Dark/</nowiki></ref> In order to cover this risk, Boskalis can ask for export credit insurances and guarantees that are provided by export credit agencies (ECAs). With these insurances and guarantees, a substantial part of the financial risk moves to governments and, ultimately, taxpayers. It is thus an important government instrument to support companies like Boskalis. Dredging companies are one sector that use the export credit facilities a lot. [[Atradius N.V.|Atradius]] DSB is the ECA that provides these insurances and guarantees on behalf of and for the account of the Dutch state. In 2016 for example, Atradius enabled dredging activities of Boskalis at a nuclear power plant in Finland, that was built by a Russian company, whose director was suspected of mismanagement and appropriation of public property.<ref>Dupont-Nivet, D. & Woutersen, Em. (2022, March 30). De overheid had principieler moeten zijn. De Groene Amsterdammer. Retrieved from <nowiki>https://www.groene.nl/artikel/de-overheid-had-principieler-moeten-zijn</nowiki></ref>    


In 1978, Boskalis received the designation ‘Royal’.<ref>Boskalis (n.d.). History. Retrieved on 11 April, 2022 from https://boskalis.com/about-us/history.html</ref> This designation is awarded by the king or queen and symbolizes the respect, appreciation and trust towards the recipient.<ref>Het Koninklijk Huis. (n.d.) Predicaat Koninklijk. Retrieved on April 19, 2022 from https://www.koninklijkhuis.nl/onderwerpen/onderscheidingen/predicaat-koninklijk</ref> The most important obligation following the designation is that the recipient will refrain from anything that will damage their reputation.<ref>Het Koninklijk Huis. (n.d.) Predicaat Koninklijk aanvragen. Retrieved on April 19, 2022 from https://www.koninklijkhuis.nl/onderwerpen/onderscheidingen/predicaat-koninklijk/aanvragen</ref>
In 1978, Boskalis received the designation ‘Royal’.<ref>Boskalis (n.d.). History. Retrieved on 11 April, 2022 from https://boskalis.com/about-us/history.html</ref> This designation is awarded by the king or queen and symbolizes the respect, appreciation and trust towards the recipient.<ref>Het Koninklijk Huis. (n.d.) Predicaat Koninklijk. Retrieved on April 19, 2022 from https://www.koninklijkhuis.nl/onderwerpen/onderscheidingen/predicaat-koninklijk</ref> The most important obligation following the designation is that the recipient will refrain from anything that will damage their reputation.<ref>Het Koninklijk Huis. (n.d.) Predicaat Koninklijk aanvragen. Retrieved on April 19, 2022 from https://www.koninklijkhuis.nl/onderwerpen/onderscheidingen/predicaat-koninklijk/aanvragen</ref>


== Paris Agreement untill Today ==
== Paris Agreement until Today ==
What has company done or refused to do since the Climate Accord of Paris?
'''Boskalis'''
Per company, where applicable refer to research on the benefits of fossil companies in the form of subisidies etc.
 
A substantial part of Boskalis’ work is located around vulnerable river, delta and coastal areas.<ref name=":0" /> Furthermore, they also work in ‘highly sensitive areas’<ref name=":0" /> where mining firms and oil and gas companies are exploring and exploiting natural resources. The ability to offer sustainable work is thus essential, according to Boskalis. Sustainability is their ‘license to operate’.<ref name=":1" /> What exactly sustainability means to Boskalis is not made explicit. In the activities that Boskalis performs, they contribute to adaptive and mitigating solutions to climate change.<ref name=":0" /> They, according to Boskalis, help countries to adapt to the consequences of climate change with flood protection and are involved in offshore wind farms in order to make renewable energy more available. Furthermore, with their salvage services they occasionally remove hazardous substances, like in 2015 when they removed heavy oil and diesel oil from a vessel that had sunk. Since 2008, Boskalis has the Building with Nature program,<ref name=":1" /> which follows the philosophy that the natural system is the starting point when designing a project, while taking all stakeholders into account.<ref name=":0" /> Boskalis said to aim to have at least one project following this philosophy a year. However, it depends on the willingness of the clients. The majority of the Building with Nature projects is conducted in the Netherlands.
 
In their 2015 Annual Report and CSR (Corporate Social Responsibility) Report Boskalis mentions the COP21 climate conference and the Paris Agreement.<ref name=":0" /><ref name="An 2015" /> The shipping sector is excluded from the commitments to limit greenhouse gas emissions. Nevertheless, they claim to take their responsibility by also taking initiative to look into ways of reducing their emissions. They focus on the CO2 emissions produced by the fuel consumption of their fleet. In order to reduce the emissions Boskalis is looking into the use of biofuels. In 2015 Boskalis, GoodFuels Marine and Finnish engine manufacturer Wärtsilä, launched a two-year biofuel pilot program. In 2016, Boskalis reports the acquirement of a vessel that partly works on LNG (gas).<ref name=":1" />
 
In 2018, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) decided that the maritime transport sector should reduce their  CO2 emissions with 50% by 2050 relative to 2008.<ref name=":2" /> Boskalis is committed to this target according to their sustainability report.<ref name="Sus 2019" /> In 2019, they set up a new CO2 reduction target that aims to be climate neutral by 2050 across their global operations (only taking into account Scope 1 and 2).<ref name="Sus 2019" /> That same year they reported on a ‘major milestone’: one of their hopper dredgers used 100% biofuel oil, made entirely from used cooking oil. Nevertheless, Boskalis believes that biofuels will not be sufficiently available and clean to reach their target and are thus also looking into alternative fuels, like hydrogen and methanol.<ref name="Sus 2019" /><ref name="Sus 2020" />
 
In 2019, another IMO regulation came into force about the sulfur content in the fuel  for international shipping. Before the limit was 3.5%, but from 2020 on it is set on 0.5%. In 2020, their climate change impact was disclosed through the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) and they got a B- rating. Their previous rating was a D.
 
Boskalis writes this and more in their sustainability reports. They especially report their milestones regarding sustainability, ongoing projects and new collaborations. They do not write about how they not contribute to a more sustainable world, although they do implicitly write that they are involved in projects in the Arctic. According to Keyzer and Geurts, Boskalis was indeed participating in digging trenches for the pipelines with which Gazprom connects Europe to the world’s largest gas reserves.<ref>Keyzer, T & Geurts, O. (2022, 31 March 2022). Russische oorlogszucht verpest Nederlands succesverhaal in Noordpoolgebied. Follow the Money. Retrieved from<nowiki/>https://www.ftm.nl/artikelen/noordpool-lonkt-nl-exploitatie-olierijk-arctisch-gebied?share=xRmczbf83swOUKgLGY%2BSVukFdYm0ui9JVA9Mu2tvr20Uuf3CROdVQz3HKiTay0s%3D </ref> In the same article it says that arctic operations are risky, for the environment, the safety of workers, and financially. Therefore, companies do not talk much about arctic projects.
 
'''Boskalis Netherlands'''
 
There is information available about the actions taken by Boskalis Nederland from 2017 on. In that year they signed a five year contract with the firm GoodFuels in order to increase their use of biofuels.<ref name="CO2 2017">Boskalis Nederland BV. (2018). CO2-Voortgangsrapportage 2017.  Retrieved from https://nederland.boskalis.com/over-ons/verantwoord-ondernemen/co2-prestatieladder.html</ref> There is no mention about subsidies, but according to Joosten<ref>Joosten, T. (2020, 25 July). De zin en onzin van biomassa. Follow the Money. Retrieved from https://www.ftm.nl/artikelen/zin-en-onzin-biomassa?share=nbhtOwOvBzbgBYoS76uVHei1yyjZ2YFDzv8Cw2yVlEqfI%2BM%2FAMvdmRioVdKyswM%3D </ref>, the Dutch government is since 2010 granting subsidies for using bio-energy. A big part of the sustainable energy subsidies is spend on bio-energy. In 2018  they started with the implementation of biofuels.<ref name="CO2 2018">Boskalis Nederland BV. (2019). CO2-Footprint en voortgangsverslag (heel) 2018.  Retrieved from https://nederland.boskalis.com/over-ons/verantwoord-ondernemen/co2-prestatieladder.html.</ref> In that year they also start with yearly ‘Meet the Buyer’ sessions and they have implemented a course called ‘Het nieuwe draaien’ (The new turning) to increase sustainable behavior among employees. In 2019, Boskalis Nederland reports a reduction of 6.4% of CO2 emissions because of the use of biofuels in their equipment.<ref name="CO2 2019" >Boskalis Nederland BV. (2020). CO2-Footprint en voortgangsverslag (heel) 2019.  Retrieved from https://nederland.boskalis.com/over-ons/verantwoord-ondernemen/co2-prestatieladder.html.</ref> This is a reduction towards what they would have emitted without the biofuel measures. In 2020, an internal coach regarding sustainable working is appointed.<ref name="CO2 2020" >Boskalis Nederland BV. (2021). CO2-Footprint en voortgangsverslag (heel) 2020.  Retrieved from https://nederland.boskalis.com/over-ons/verantwoord-ondernemen/co2-prestatieladder.html</ref> Furthermore, more sustainable machines have been acquired. One of the asphalt plants that Boskalis uses is now completely switched to green energy, which means that all sites used by the Dutch company use green energy. In 2021, the CO2 emissions are increased again by 6%.<ref name="CO2 2021">Boskalis Nederland BV. (2022). CO2-Footprint en voortgangsverslag Januari - Juni 2021. Retrieved from https://nederland.boskalis.com/over-ons/verantwoord-ondernemen/co2-prestatieladder.html</ref> In the report they state that this is the case because more equipment is employed than the year before.   
 
Since 2011, Boskalis has participated in the CO2 Performance Ladder. The CO2 Performance Ladder is a tool used by Dutch government agencies and businesses to recognize performance in the areas of energy saving, efficient use of materials and renewable energy.<ref name="Sus 2021" /> Since 2012, they have the highest-level certification for all Boskalis business units in the Netherlands.    


=== Financial Results since 2015 ===
=== Financial Results since 2015 ===
This table is meant to indicate that the companies have plenty of money to make their company more sustainable. Clearly distinguish between Dutch data and international data.


{| class="wikitable"
{| class="wikitable"
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!Year
!Year
!Revenue
!Revenue
!Profit
!Profit (loss)
!Dividend
!Dividend
|-
|-
|2015
|2015<ref name="An 2015">Boskalis. (2016). Boskalis annual report 2015. Retrieved from https://boskalis.com/reports.html</ref>
|XXX Billion EUR  
|3.240 Billion EUR  
|XXX EUR
|0.444 Billion EUR
|XXX EUR
|47.562 Million EUR
|-
|-
|2016
|2016<ref name="An 2016">Boskalis. (2017). Boskalis annual report 2016. Retrieved from https://boskalis.com/reports.html</ref>
|XXX Billion EUR  
|2.596 Billion EUR  
|XXX EUR
| (0.562) Billion EUR
|XXX EUR
|55.762 Million EUR
|-
|-
|2017
|2017<ref name="An 2017">Boskalis. (2018). Boskalis annual report 2017. Retrieved from https://boskalis.com/reports.html</ref>
|XXX Billion EUR  
|2.337 Billion EUR  
|XXX EUR
|0.150 Billion EUR
|XXX EUR
|29.533 Million EUR
|-
|-
|2018
|2018<ref name="An 2018">Boskalis. (2019). Boskalis annual report 2018. Retrieved from https://boskalis.com/reports.html</ref>
|XXX Billion EUR  
|2.57 Billion EUR  
|XXX EUR
| (0.434) Billion EUR
|XXX EUR
|36.289 Million EUR
|-
|-
|2019
|2019 <ref name="An 2019">Boskalis. (2020). Boskalis annual report 2019. Retrieved from https://boskalis.com/reports.html</ref>
|XXX Billion EUR  
|2.645 Billion EUR  
|XXX EUR
|0.075 Billion EUR
|XXX EUR
|66.999 Million EUR
|-
|-
|2020
|2020<ref name="An 2020">Boskalis. (2021). Boskalis annual report 2020. Retrieved from https://boskalis.com/reports.html</ref>
|XXX Billion EUR  
|2.525 Billion EUR  
|XXX EUR
| (0.097) Billion EUR
|XXX EUR
| -
|-
|-
|2021  
|2021 <ref name="An 2021" />
|2.957 Billion EUR  
|2.957 Billion EUR  
|1.16 EUR
|0.148 Billion EUR
|.50 EUR
|64.819 Million EUR
|}
|}


====Scandals and controversies====
*
'''2006 - 2007 Mauritius'''
 
In 2006 and 2007, Boskalis made six payments to the former port director of Mauritius, Siddick Chady.<ref>Boskalis maakt vuile handen. (2013, July 25). Follow the Money. Retrieved from
https://www.ftm.nl/artikelen/boskalis-maakt-vuile-handen?share=%2FHst07Pz674d1au5muZCOA7JlG0ihVeY%2Bo8k%2Fg%2Fgv93y2VgDlEAN9WQ54Nnfbw%3D%3D
</ref><ref>De Boer, R. (2008, August 22). L’Affaire Boskalis. Fraudezaak op Mauritius. De Groene Amsterdammer. Retrieved from
https://www.groene.nl/artikel/deze-week--113</ref>
This was done in order to acquire dredging contracts in Port Louis. A total of nearly 89 thousand euros in bribes were transferred to his bank accounts in Singapore and the UK. In May 2013, Boskalis made a full confession of guilt before a court in Mauritius.2011 - 2017 Poland
 
'''2011 - 2017 Poland'''
 
In the shipyard of company Stocznia in the Polish city of Police, North Koreans have been employed through human trafficking since the beginning of 2011 until the end of 2017.<ref>Van der Veen, C. (2018, February 6). In het kort: wat we weten over Nederlandse scheepsbouwers en Noord-Koreaanse dwangarbeiders. De Correspondent. Retrieved from https://decorrespondent.nl/7906/in-het-kort-wat-we-weten-over-nederlandse-scheepsbouwers-en-noord-koreaanse-dwangarbeiders/208628651088-5d23c7fe
</ref> Different Dutch shipbuilders, including Boskalis, had at least 33 ships made at the yard. The North Koreans who worked at the shipyard were paid little or nothing for their work. The North Koreans were recruited by the regime with the promise of high wages and higher status. They made days of twelve hours or longer and received little leave. Boskalis confirmed that 'four identical hulls' had been taken from the Partner shipyard, which were further finished in the Netherlands into full-sized vessels. According to a spokesperson, Boskalis was not aware that North Korean forced laborers were working there.
 
'''2020 - Indonesia'''
 
Boskalis was working near the city of Makassar, on the Island of Sulawesi, to expand the port.<ref>Indonesische vissers protesteren tegen baggeraar Boskalis. (2020, July 13). NOS. Retrieved from https://nos.nl/artikel/2340610-indonesische-vissers-protesteren-tegen-baggeraar-boskalis</ref> Dredgers take sand from the sea, and deposit it miles away. Off the coast of the Indonesian island, dozens of fishermen protested against Boskalis' dredging activities for weeks. Because of the dredging activity, the fish population drops and the water is clouded. Locals said they were losing income and feared longer-term damage. Boskalis stated that the fishermen have been informed of the dredging project and are being financially compensated. However, the fishermen did not seem to know anything of this.
 
'''2012 - 2020 Kenya'''
 
From August 2012 till August 2013, Boskalis International B.V. was a sub-contractor of the Japanese company Toyo Construction in the project of expanding the Port of Mombasa in Kenya.<ref>Boskalis. (2013). Project Sheet. Port of Mombasa, Kenya. Retrieved from https://boskalis.com/about-us/projects/detail/port-development-mombasa.html</ref> According to Roodenburg and Sonderen,<ref>Roodenburg, E. & Sonderen, L. (2020, January 22). Baggeraars op de korrel. De Groene Amsterdammer. Retrieved from https://www.groene.nl/artikel/baggeraars-op-de-korrel</ref> the contractor was a Chinese company. This project was conducted in phases, and from 2012 till 2013 the first phase took place. For the complete project some fifteen million cubic meters of sand was needed. This sand was partly taken from Diani. The coastline of Diani belongs to a nature reserve and removing sand disrupts the ecosystem. According to Boskalis, an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and an Environmental Monitoring Management Plan (EMMP) were prepared and local environmental regulations and restrictions were met throughout the project. However, as Roodenburg and Sonderen write, the EIA had many flaws. Residents of Diani disputed the EIA and then quickly new attachments were brought in. Furthermore, there had hardly been any discussion with residents, tour operators and fishermen. And there was no recent research into the condition of marine life, the coastline and the impact on fishing. The residents' association started a lawsuit against the contractor company. In 2016, when all the sand for the first phase of the harbor project had been removed from Diani, the judge concluded: The dredging company should indeed not have been allowed to extract sand from the nature reserve. The fishermen are compensated with about sixteen thousand dollars. They had to divide that among themselves. The money has not arrived yet.
 
According to Roodenburg and Sonderen, in March 2019, the second phase starts, this time with the Japanese company. Boskalis again extracts sand off the coast of Diani. There is no mention of this on Boskalis’ website. In order to circumvent a ruling like the one in the previous court case, this time the sand is being taken off the Waa and Tiwi coastal strips, along Diani's outer borders. Both are just short of being nature reserves.
During sand extraction, sand that is too finely extracted flows back into the ocean, just off the coast, where it partly ends up on top of the coral. The sand blocks the light, which can cause the coral to suffocate. Without the coral reef, the waves would hit the coast much harder and swallow up the beaches of Diani. After protests from the residents, Boskalis suggests to the port authorities and Toyo that they sail in a large loop instead of parallel to the coast, so that the fine sand no longer lands on the vulnerable corals, but a lot further away.
The inhabitants of Diani are fortunate in that they have the power and resources to initiate legal proceedings and carry out scientific research at their own expense. For many vulnerable communities in other places, this is not the case.


== Current Emissions ==
== Current Emissions ==
'''Boskalis'''
'''Boskalis'''


In their sustainability reports, Boskalis does not mention anything about the greenhouse gas emissions of scope 3. Furthermore, they do not show separate numbers for scope 1 and 2. According to Boskalis, their total Scope 1 and 2 CO2 emissions amounted to 1.08 million tonnes in 2021.<ref name="Sus 2021" >Boskalis. (2021). Boskalis sustainability report 2021. Retrieved from https://boskalis.com/.</ref> The largest part of the CO2 footprint is linked to the vessels. Emissions from the fleet amounted to 1.06 million tonnes.  
In their sustainability reports, Boskalis does not mention anything about the greenhouse gas emissions of [[Definitions|Scope 3]]. Furthermore, they do not show separate numbers for Scope 1 and 2. According to Boskalis, their total [[Definitions|Scope 1 and 2]] CO2 emissions amounted to 1.08 million tonnes in 2021.<ref name="Sus 2021">Boskalis. (2022). Boskalis sustainability report 2021. Retrieved from https://boskalis.com/reports.html</ref> The largest part of the CO2 footprint is linked to the vessels. Emissions from the fleet amounted to 1.06 million tonnes.  


The reported emissions are from the Offshore Energy division, the Dredging and Inland Infra division and from Offices. They do not include the emissions from the Towage and Salvage division, because the Towage business is incorporated in joint ventures and the Salvage operations rely on vessels from the other divisions or third parties.  
The reported emissions are from the Offshore Energy division, the Dredging and Inland Infra division and from Offices. They do not include the emissions from the Towage and Salvage division, because the Towage business is incorporated in joint ventures and the Salvage operations rely on vessels from the other divisions or third parties.  
Line 249: Line 245:
!Scope 1 & 2
!Scope 1 & 2
|-
|-
|2015<ref>Boskalis. (2015). Boskalis CSR report 2015. Retrieved from https://boskalis.com/.</ref>
|2015<ref name=":0">Boskalis. (2016). Boskalis CSR report 2015. Retrieved from https://boskalis.com/reports.html</ref>
|1.521 Megatonnes CO2
|1.521 [[Definitions|megatonnes]] CO2
|-
|-
|2016<ref>Boskalis. (2016). Boskalis CSR report 2016. Retrieved from https://boskalis.com/.</ref>
|2016<ref name=":1">Boskalis. (2017). Boskalis CSR report 2016. Retrieved from https://boskalis.com/reports.html</ref>
|1.249 Megatonnes CO2
|1.249 megatonnes CO2
|-
|-
|2017<ref>Boskalis. (2017). Boskalis CSR report 2017. Retrieved from https://boskalis.com/.</ref>
|2017<ref>Boskalis. (2017). Boskalis CSR report 2017. Retrieved from https://boskalis.com/.</ref>
|1.223 Megatonnes CO2
|1.223 megatonnes CO2
|-
|-
|2018<ref>Boskalis. (2018). Boskalis sustainability report 2018. Retrieved from https://boskalis.com/.</ref>
|2018<ref name=":2">Boskalis. (2019). Boskalis sustainability report 2018. Retrieved from https://boskalis.com/reports.html</ref>
|1.180 Megatonnes CO2
|1.180 megatonnes CO2
|-
|-
|2019<ref name="Sus 2019" >Boskalis. (2019). Boskalis sustainability report 2019. Retrieved from https://boskalis.com/.</ref>  
|2019<ref name="Sus 2019">Boskalis. (2020). Boskalis sustainability report 2019. Retrieved from https://boskalis.com/reports.html</ref>
|1.111 Megatonnes CO2
|1.111 megatonnes CO2
|-
|-
|2020<ref name="Sus 2020" >Boskalis. (2020). Boskalis sustainability report 2020. Retrieved from https://boskalis.com/.</ref>
|2020<ref name="Sus 2020">Boskalis. (2021). Boskalis sustainability report 2020. Retrieved from https://boskalis.com/reports.html</ref>
|.984 Megatonnes CO2
|.984 megatonnes CO2
|-
|-
|2021 <ref name="Sus 2021" />  
|2021 <ref name="Sus 2021" />  
|1.078 Megatonnes CO2
|1.078 megatonnes CO2
|-
|-
|}
|}


'''Boskalis Nederland'''
'''Boskalis Netherlands'''


Boskalis Nederland does not report any emissions regarding Scope 3. They do have objectives for this scope. See more under Climate plans & policy. Scope 1 includes equipment wet, equipment dry, equipment asphalt, since 2020 equipment transport, and until 2021 equipment CTD. Scope 2 includes the electricity use of company sites, asphalt plants and cleaning plants and the electricity or fuel use by passenger transport.  
Boskalis Nederland does not report any emissions regarding Scope 3. They do have objectives for this scope. See more under Climate plans & policy. Scope 1 includes equipment wet, equipment dry, equipment asphalt, since 2020 equipment transport, and until 2021 equipment CTD. Scope 2 includes the electricity use of company sites, asphalt plants and cleaning plants and the electricity or fuel use by passenger transport.  
Line 283: Line 279:
!Total 1 & 2  
!Total 1 & 2  
|-
|-
|2017<ref name="CO2 2017">Boskalis Nederland BV. (2018). CO2-Voortgangsrapportage 2017.  Retrieved from https://nederland.boskalis.com/over-ons/verantwoord-ondernemen/co2-prestatieladder.html
|2017<ref name="CO2 2017" />
.</ref>
|66,620  
|66,620  
|1,429
|1,429
|68,050
|68,050
|-
|-
|2018<ref name="CO2 2018">Boskalis Nederland BV. (2019). CO2-Footprint en voortgangsverslag (heel) 2018.  Retrieved from https://nederland.boskalis.com/over-ons/verantwoord-ondernemen/co2-prestatieladder.html.</ref>
|2018<ref name="CO2 2018" />
|114,536
|114,536
|1,500  
|1,500  
|116,036
|116,036
|-
|-
|2019<ref name="CO2 2019" >Boskalis Nederland BV. (2020). CO2-Footprint en voortgangsverslag (heel) 2019.  Retrieved from https://nederland.boskalis.com/over-ons/verantwoord-ondernemen/co2-prestatieladder.html.</ref>  
|2019<ref name="CO2 2019" />
|69,300
|69,300
|1,639
|1,639
|70,939
|70,939
|-
|-
|2020<ref name="CO2 2020" >Boskalis Nederland BV. (2021). CO2-Footprint en voortgangsverslag (heel) 2020.  Retrieved from https://nederland.boskalis.com/over-ons/verantwoord-ondernemen/co2-prestatieladder.html
|2020<ref name="CO2 2020" />
</ref>
|46,828
|46,828
|288
|288
|47,116
|47,116
|-
|-
|2021 (Jan - Juni)<ref name="CO2 2021">Boskalis Nederland BV. (2022). CO2-Footprint en voortgangsverslag Januari - Juni 2021.  Retrieved from https://nederland.boskalis.com/over-ons/verantwoord-ondernemen/co2-prestatieladder.html</ref>
|2021 (Jan - Juni)<ref name="CO2 2021" />
|12,737
|12,737
|5,025
|5,025
Line 315: Line 309:
'''Boskalis'''
'''Boskalis'''


In the Annual report of 2019, Boskalis presents their new CO2-reduction target: They aim to be climate neutral by 2050 across their global operations. This target only takes into account Scope 1 and 2, and not 3.<ref name="Sus 2019" /> In order to do this, they have an Emissions Reduction Taskforce, overseen by a member of the Board of Management.<ref name="Sus 2020" /> The activities of the Taskforce focus on five distinct areas: Fuel efficiency, new energy sources, carbon offset and credits, trends, regulations and collaboration, and commercial offering. Regarding Scope 3, they claim they start initiatives for emissions reduction where feasible on the basis of impact and influences.  
In the Annual report of 2019, Boskalis presents their new CO2-reduction target: They aim to be climate neutral by 2050 across their global operations. This target only takes into account Scope 1 and 2, and not 3.<ref name="Sus 2019" /> In order to do this, they have an Emissions Reduction Taskforce, overseen by a member of the Board of Management.<ref name="Sus 2020" /> The activities of the Taskforce focus on five distinct areas: Fuel efficiency, new energy sources, [[Definitions|carbon offset and credits]], trends, regulations and collaboration, and commercial offering. Regarding Scope 3, they claim they start initiatives for emissions reduction where feasible on the basis of impact and influences.  


'''Boskalis Nederland'''
'''Boskalis Netherlands'''


Boskalis has specific climate objectives for Boskalis Nederland.<ref name="CO2 2021" /> These objectives are set with the CO2 Performance Ladder. The main objective concerns Scope 1: By 2025 CO2 emissions caused by fuel consumption by own equipment and passenger transport must be reduced by at least 10 percent compared to the base year 2020. However, Boskalis counts passenger transport to Scope 2 emissions. Then there is an additional objective concerning Scope 2: The CO2 emissions due to electricity consumption by the company buildings, project sites and production sites (asphalt plants and cleaning sites) will be maintained at 0 percent until 2025. Nevertheless, following the reported emissions, it does not seem like the emissions are at 0 for these sites. In this report also additional objectives for Scope 3 are mentioned. There are three plans: In relation to suppliers: Annual dialogue with (a selected group of) suppliers on CO2 reduction in the chain; In relation to subcontractors: By the end of 2025, they want to work with at least one subcontractor in order to reduce the emissions caused by the subcontractor's equipment on our project by 10 percent; and with regard to chain analyses, they have one objective per chain.  
Boskalis has specific climate objectives for Boskalis Nederland.<ref name="CO2 2021" /> These objectives are set with the CO2 Performance Ladder. The main objective concerns Scope 1: By 2025 CO2 emissions caused by fuel consumption by own equipment and passenger transport must be reduced by at least 10 percent compared to the base year 2020. However, Boskalis counts passenger transport to Scope 2 emissions. Then there is an additional objective concerning Scope 2: The CO2 emissions due to electricity consumption by the company buildings, project sites and production sites (asphalt plants and cleaning sites) will be maintained at 0 percent until 2025. Nevertheless, following the reported emissions, it does not seem like the emissions are at 0 for these sites. In this report also additional objectives for Scope 3 are mentioned. There are three plans: In relation to suppliers: Annual dialogue with (a selected group of) suppliers on CO2 reduction in the chain; In relation to subcontractors: By the end of 2025, they want to work with at least one subcontractor in order to reduce the emissions caused by the subcontractor's equipment on our project by 10 percent; and with regard to chain analyses, they have one objective per chain.  
=== NewClimate Institute (NCI) Report ===
=== Due Diligence ===  
NCI rates Boskalis low on transparency and very low on integrity. <ref>NewClimate Institute. (2022). Evaluating corporate target setting in the Netherlands. Retrieved from https://milieudefensie.nl/actueel/onderzoek-naar-de-klimaatplannen-van-29-grote-vervuilers</ref>
Keep the broader context in mind. Is the company integer when it comes to deforestation, palm oil, biodiversity, human rights etc etc? Be critical in the sources used here.
 
Boskalis is committed to become climate neutral across its operations by 2050. According to NCI, this ambition is undermined in various ways. First of all, this net-zero target only covers scope 1 and 2. Scope 3 is left out, while the scope 3 emissions may be significant. These emissions include for example the [[Definitions|upstream production]] of vessel fuels used. Furthermore, Boskalis installed infrastructure for the transport of oil and gas and these indirect emissions are likely sustantial. Although the GHG Protocol does not require companies to report on indirect emissions, NCI states that by not reporting these emissions, Boskalis can hide fact that is is developing fossil fuel infrastructure. Because Boskalis does not transparently report on its complete GHG footprint, it remains unclear what share of  emissions are covered by this climate neutral target. 
 
The net-zero ambition may be further undermined by the reliance on contentious renewable energy certificates. Boskalis purchases electricity with Dutch Biomass NTA 8080 certifications. These certifications are used to demonstrate that biomass used for energy generations meets certain sustainability criteria. The use of such certifications does not have impact on additional renewable electricity capacity and does not prevent other consumers to use carbon intensive electricity. 
 
Moreover, Boskalis states to "''actively investigate sustainable options for offsetting emissions''"<ref>Boskalis (2022a) Climate Change. Available at: <nowiki>https://boskalis.com/sustainability/focusareas/climate-change.html</nowiki> </ref>  which suggests that the company, in order to achieve it net-zero target, plans to [[Definitions|offset]] an undefined amount of emissions. However, it does not confirm this, nor does it giving any other information regarding offsetting. 
 
Lastly, the range of emission reducing measures that Boskalis pursues, lack information and therefore, their potential mitigation impact cannot be fully examined. 
 
== Scandals and controversies ==
'''2006 - 2007 Mauritius'''
 
In 2006 and 2007, Boskalis made six payments to the former port director of Mauritius, Siddick Chady.<ref>Boskalis maakt vuile handen. (2013, July 25). Follow the Money. Retrieved from
https://www.ftm.nl/artikelen/boskalis-maakt-vuile-handen?share=%2FHst07Pz674d1au5muZCOA7JlG0ihVeY%2Bo8k%2Fg%2Fgv93y2VgDlEAN9WQ54Nnfbw%3D%3D
</ref><ref>De Boer, R. (2008, August 22). L’Affaire Boskalis. Fraudezaak op Mauritius. De Groene Amsterdammer. Retrieved from
https://www.groene.nl/artikel/deze-week--113</ref>
This was done in order to acquire dredging contracts in Port Louis. A total of nearly 89 thousand euros in bribes were transferred to his bank accounts in Singapore and the UK. In May 2013, Boskalis made a full confession of guilt before a court in Mauritius.
 
'''2011 - 2017 Poland'''
 
In the shipyard of company Stocznia in the Polish city of Police, North Koreans have been employed through human trafficking since the beginning of 2011 until the end of 2017.<ref>Van der Veen, C. (2018, February 6). In het kort: wat we weten over Nederlandse scheepsbouwers en Noord-Koreaanse dwangarbeiders. De Correspondent. Retrieved from https://decorrespondent.nl/7906/in-het-kort-wat-we-weten-over-nederlandse-scheepsbouwers-en-noord-koreaanse-dwangarbeiders/208628651088-5d23c7fe
</ref> Different Dutch shipbuilders, including Boskalis, had at least 33 ships made at the yard. The North Koreans who worked at the shipyard were paid little or nothing for their work. The North Koreans were recruited by the regime with the promise of high wages and higher status. They made days of twelve hours or longer and received little leave. Boskalis confirmed that 'four identical hulls' had been taken from the Partner shipyard, which were further finished in the Netherlands into full-sized vessels. According to a spokesperson, Boskalis was not aware that North Korean forced laborers were working there.
 
=== Due Diligence ===
'''Russia'''
 
Boskalis has helped with building Nord Stream I and Turkstream, pipelines with wich Russia exports gas to European countries.<ref>Den Hollander, O. & Keyzer, T. (2022, June 3). Nederland bouwde Ruslands sterkste economische wapen: pijpleidingen. Follow the Money. Retrieved from https://www.ftm.nl/artikelen/turkstream-2?utm_source=nieuwsbrief&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Turkstream2&share=9LvHIK0BXi6gof3pObkrha4sF%2BEh3rfnO7XxAw8L6rd9Ch5FZ81RgfRkLuArEmE%3D</ref> 
 
'''2020 Indonesia'''
 
Boskalis was working near the city of Makassar, on the Island of Sulawesi, to expand the port.<ref>Indonesische vissers protesteren tegen baggeraar Boskalis. (2020, July 13). NOS. Retrieved from https://nos.nl/artikel/2340610-indonesische-vissers-protesteren-tegen-baggeraar-boskalis</ref> Dredgers take sand from the sea, and deposit it miles away. Off the coast of the Indonesian island, dozens of fishermen protested against Boskalis' dredging activities for weeks. Because of the dredging activity, the fish population drops and the water is clouded. Locals said they were losing income and feared longer-term damage. Boskalis stated that the fishermen have been informed of the dredging project and are being financially compensated. However, the fishermen did not seem to know anything of this.
 
'''2012 - 2020 Kenya'''
 
From August 2012 till August 2013, Boskalis International B.V. was a sub-contractor of the Japanese company Toyo Construction in the project of expanding the Port of Mombasa in Kenya.<ref>Boskalis. (2013). Project Sheet. Port of Mombasa, Kenya. Retrieved from https://boskalis.com/about-us/projects/detail/port-development-mombasa.html</ref> According to Roodenburg and Sonderen,<ref>Roodenburg, E. & Sonderen, L. (2020, January 22). Baggeraars op de korrel. De Groene Amsterdammer. Retrieved from https://www.groene.nl/artikel/baggeraars-op-de-korrel</ref> the contractor was a Chinese company. This project was conducted in phases, and from 2012 till 2013 the first phase took place. For the complete project some fifteen million cubic meters of sand was needed. This sand was partly taken from Diani. The coastline of Diani belongs to a nature reserve and removing sand disrupts the ecosystem. According to Boskalis, an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and an Environmental Monitoring Management Plan (EMMP) were prepared and local environmental regulations and restrictions were met throughout the project. However, as Roodenburg and Sonderen write, the EIA had many flaws. Residents of Diani disputed the EIA and then quickly new attachments were brought in. Furthermore, there had hardly been any discussion with residents, tour operators and fishermen. And there was no recent research into the condition of marine life, the coastline and the impact on fishing. The residents' association started a lawsuit against the contractor company. In 2016, when all the sand for the first phase of the harbor project had been removed from Diani, the judge concluded: The dredging company should indeed not have been allowed to extract sand from the nature reserve. The fishermen are compensated with about sixteen thousand dollars. They had to divide that among themselves. The money has not arrived yet.
 
According to Roodenburg and Sonderen, in March 2019, the second phase starts, this time with the Japanese company. Boskalis again extracts sand off the coast of Diani. There is no mention of this on Boskalis’ website. In order to circumvent a ruling like the one in the previous court case, this time the sand is being taken off the Waa and Tiwi coastal strips, along Diani's outer borders. Both are just short of being nature reserves.
During sand extraction, sand that is too finely extracted flows back into the ocean, just off the coast, where it partly ends up on top of the coral. The sand blocks the light, which can cause the coral to suffocate. Without the coral reef, the waves would hit the coast much harder and swallow up the beaches of Diani. After protests from the residents, Boskalis suggests to the port authorities and Toyo that they sail in a large loop instead of parallel to the coast, so that the fine sand no longer lands on the vulnerable corals, but a lot further away.
The inhabitants of Diani are fortunate in that they have the power and resources to initiate legal proceedings and carry out scientific research at their own expense. For many vulnerable communities in other places, this is not the case.
 
'''2022 Philippines'''
 
At the end of 2020, Boskalis was awarded a contract for the land development of the new Manila International Airport, a project of more than 1.5 billion euro.<ref name=":3">Boskalis. (2022, May 24). Boskalis project in Manila receives insurance from the Dutch state. [Press release]. Retrieved from <nowiki>https://boskalis.com/press/press-releases-and-company-news/detail/boskalis-project-in-manila-receives-insurance-from-the-dutch-state.html</nowiki></ref> Because it is a huge and risky project, Boskalis asked for a export credit insurance of the Dutch state via Atradius DSB. On the 24th of May, 2022, it was decided that this export credit insurance was accepted.<ref name=":3" /><ref name=":4">Van Rij, M.L.A. (2022, May 24). Kamerbrief en antwoorden op Kamervragen over exportkredietverzekering voor omstreden project Filipijnen [Kamerbrief]. Retrieved from <nowiki>https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/2022/05/24/kamerbrief-en-antwoorden-op-kamervragen-over-exportkredietverzekering-voor-omstreden-project-filipijnen</nowiki></ref> Before, a coalition of Filipino and Dutch civil society organizations and scientists had asked the Dutch state to withdraw from this project.<ref>Shannon, M. & Dulce, L.  (2022, January 31). Nederlandse ‘Maasvlakte’ in de baai van Manilla staat haaks op bescherming natuur. De Volkskrant. Retrieved from www.volkskrant.nl/columns-opinie/opinie-nederlandse-maasvlakte-in-de-baai-van-manilla-staat-haaks-op-bescherming-natuur~b5d9a5d8/</ref> According to the coalition, the bay of Manilla is very vulnerable to climate change. The project that Boskalis was awarded will only put more pressure on this area, resulting in more flooding and impacting sea life. Wetlands that are crucial for CO2 storage and that house many unique animals will be destroyed. Furthermore, people were pressured to destroy their homes to make place for the project and fishermen will not have access to the fishing grounds, of which they are dependent for their subsistence. Boskalis is presented as a key figure for climate adaptation and to thus make communities and ecosystems more resilient. However, according to the coalition, with the Manila Airport this is not the case. Also, critical questions were asked by the Partij voor de Dieren to the deputy minister of Finances about the export credit insurance.<ref name=":4" /> Nevertheless, the export credit insurance was accepted by the deputy minister.  


== Conclusion ==
== Conclusion ==
Recap of the position and influence of the company. Are the climate plans of the company enough to be in line with goals of the Paris Agreement? Is the company doing enough? Are the company's targets realistic?
Boskalis is one of the biggest companies in the dredging industry, involved in many projects all around the world. Sustainability appears to be important to Boskalis and Boskalis is thus involved in many technologically advanced projects, is committed to CO2 reduction targets, and participates in various benchmark surveys that monitor sustainability performance. At first sight, it thus seems as if Boskalis takes climate change seriously. It also seems to comply with the ambitions and rules of other organizations and institutions. However, there are no clear ambitions regarding Scope 3. In addition, there are no intermediary ambitions known for the main ambition of Boskalis to become climate neutral regarding Scope 1 and 2 in 2050. It will thus be difficult to determine in the coming years whether Boskalis is on track to achieve its ambition. The target therefore does not look realistic. Furthermore, sustainability seems to be especially of importance for projects taking place in the Netherlands and other North-West European countries. Moreover, they repeatedly state that all stakeholder are taken into account when executing a project, but this does not seem to be the case as examples have shown.


==References==
==References==

Latest revision as of 10:08, 7 September 2022

Royal Boskalis Westminster N.V.
Bedrijf Logo
Quick Facts
TypePublic
sectorDredging & other maritime services
Headquarters (Benelux Organization)Papendrecht, Netherlands
Year of Origin1910
Emissions (Scope 1&2)1.078 megatonnes of CO2 (2021)
NCI assessmentVery low
Total RevenueEUR 2.957 million (2021)
Stock ExchangeAmsterdam (Euronext)
Key PeoplePeter Berdowski (CEO), Carlo van Noort (CFO)
Number of employees10,250 (2021)
Subsidiaries
  • Among others,
  • Boskalis Dragamex
  • Cofra
  • Boskalis Australia
  • Boskalis Nederland
  • Boskalis Environmental
  • SMIT Salvage
  • Boskalis Hirdes
  • Boskalis Russia
  • Boskalis Rockfall
  • Boskalis Terramare
  • Boskalis Westminster
  • Nigerian Westminster Dredging
  • Irish Dredging
  • Llanelli Sand
  • Boskalis Brazil

Royal Boskalis Westminster N.V., stylized as Boskalis, is one of the biggest dredging companies of the world. Traditionally, Boskalis' core activity is dredging, but today they also offer services such as the construction and maintenance of inland and offshore infrastructure, maritime services and contracting to the offshore energy sector, towage services, emergency response, and salvage services. Boskalis was established in 1910 by a group of families in Sliedrecht, the Netherlands. Its headquarters are located in Papendrecht, the Netherlands.

Company Structure

In 1971 the company went to the stock market and became a public company.[1] Present day, HAL Investments BV is by far Boskalis’ biggest shareholder owning just over 45% of the share.[2] In March 2022, the investment company announced that they want to take over Boskalis.[3] According to HAL, Boskalis is better off as a private company. Boskalis is examining the bid.

Boskalis has a history of expanding to the foreign market and of diversification by providing different services. These strategies did not turn out to be a success. At the beginning of the 80s, the company was almost bankrupt. By focusing again on dredging and selling all the services that did not have anything to do with that, the company could survive.

Since 2000, Boskalis is again looking for ways to grow, although it focuses on maritime services. Present day, Boskalis has over 130 group companies in around 40 countries over the world. Furthermore, Boskalis has over 25 joint operations.

Boskalis uses a two-tier Board model, which means that management and supervision are segregated. The company has a Group Management, consisting of the members of the Board of Management and the Group Directors. The Group Management meets on a regular basis so that the Board of Management can obtain a full overview of the activities in the divisions of the company, to align the day-to-day management across the company and to ensure optimal exchange of information between the divisions.

Board of Management

The Board of Management consists of four members and is chaired by Peter Berdowski. It is responsible for the day-to-day management of the business. Furthermore, it is responsible for the continuity of the company and for setting out and realizing the company’s strategy. The remuneration is reported differently in the Annual report and the Remuneration report. The following numbers are from the Annual report 2021.

Board of Management [2]
Name Function Remuneration x1000 EUR
Peter Berdowski Chairman 2,935 EUR
Theo Baartmans Member 1,865 EUR
Bart Heijermans Member 1,409 EUR
Carlo van Noort Chief Financial Officer 1,362 EUR

Supervisory Board

The Supervisory Board is responsible for supervising the Board of Management on the strategy and on management performance, and for advising the Board of Management. There are three committees that the Supervisory Board works in: the Audit Committee, the Remuneration Committee and the Selection and Appointment Committee.

Supervisory Board[2]
Name Function Remuneration x1000 EUR
Jeroen van der Veer Chairman 73 EUR
Jack de Kreij Deputy Chairman 57 EUR
Daan Sperling Member 58 EUR
Jacqueline Tammenoms Bakker Member 54 EUR
Jaap van Wiechen Member 58 EUR
Renée Jones-Bos Member 52 EUR

Accountant

From the 2022 financial year on, KPMG is Boskalis’ auditor.[4] Before, the external auditor was Ernst & Young Accountants LLP (EY), but the maximum term of appointment has expired. KPMG and Ernst & Young are together with PwC and Deloitte the ‘Big Four’.[5] These multinationals are responsible for 60 percent of the mandatory audits in the Netherlands. Of the market listed companies, they even have nine out of ten as clients. KPMG has a history of flaws.

In the annual report of 2021, climate-related risks and the energy transition are mentioned in the report of EY. However, the assessment of these risks did not lead to a key audit matter.[2]

Main Activity

The company is divided into three segments: Dredging & Inland Infra, Offshore Energy, and Towage & Salvage.[2] Dredging and inland infra account for the biggest part of the revenue, with more than 50%. Close second is the offshore energy segment with around 43%. Last comes towage and salvage with around 5%.

Dredging is traditionally the core activity of Boskalis. Dredging is the activity of removing material from a water environment. This material can be reused elsewhere. According to Boskalis, projects that fall under this segment can consist for example of the construction, maintenance and deepening of ports and waterways; of land reclamation; of coastal defense and riverbank protection; of the extraction of minerals; and of soil improvement. In the Netherlands, Boskalis is also involved in dry infrastructure projects such as the construction of roads and bridges.

The Offshore Energy segment consists of projects involved in oil, gas, and renewable energy companies. Boskalis is for example involved in the engineering, construction, maintenance and decommissioning of oil and gas (LNG) facilities, offshore platforms, pipelines, cables and offshore wind farms.

Towage is the service of pulling a boat along by another boat. The joint ventures Keppel Smit Towage and Smit Lamnalco are the key players in this. They have over 200 vessels to provide assistance to oil and chemical tankers, LNG carriers, container ships and more. Salvage is the service of providing assistance to vessels in distress and of removing shipwrecks and hazardous substances.

Government

Rijkswaterstaat was and still is an important commissioning party for Boskalis.[1] Rijkswaterstaat is part of the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management and in charge of the design, construction, management and maintenance of the main infrastructure facilities in the Netherlands.[6] Boskalis has a long history of becoming less dependent on Rijkswaterstaat. In doing so, it entered the foreign market with varying success.

The undertaking of projects in the foreign market has a higher risk of non-payment by clients.[7] In order to cover this risk, Boskalis can ask for export credit insurances and guarantees that are provided by export credit agencies (ECAs). With these insurances and guarantees, a substantial part of the financial risk moves to governments and, ultimately, taxpayers. It is thus an important government instrument to support companies like Boskalis. Dredging companies are one sector that use the export credit facilities a lot. Atradius DSB is the ECA that provides these insurances and guarantees on behalf of and for the account of the Dutch state. In 2016 for example, Atradius enabled dredging activities of Boskalis at a nuclear power plant in Finland, that was built by a Russian company, whose director was suspected of mismanagement and appropriation of public property.[8]  

In 1978, Boskalis received the designation ‘Royal’.[9] This designation is awarded by the king or queen and symbolizes the respect, appreciation and trust towards the recipient.[10] The most important obligation following the designation is that the recipient will refrain from anything that will damage their reputation.[11]

Paris Agreement until Today

Boskalis

A substantial part of Boskalis’ work is located around vulnerable river, delta and coastal areas.[12] Furthermore, they also work in ‘highly sensitive areas’[12] where mining firms and oil and gas companies are exploring and exploiting natural resources. The ability to offer sustainable work is thus essential, according to Boskalis. Sustainability is their ‘license to operate’.[13] What exactly sustainability means to Boskalis is not made explicit. In the activities that Boskalis performs, they contribute to adaptive and mitigating solutions to climate change.[12] They, according to Boskalis, help countries to adapt to the consequences of climate change with flood protection and are involved in offshore wind farms in order to make renewable energy more available. Furthermore, with their salvage services they occasionally remove hazardous substances, like in 2015 when they removed heavy oil and diesel oil from a vessel that had sunk. Since 2008, Boskalis has the Building with Nature program,[13] which follows the philosophy that the natural system is the starting point when designing a project, while taking all stakeholders into account.[12] Boskalis said to aim to have at least one project following this philosophy a year. However, it depends on the willingness of the clients. The majority of the Building with Nature projects is conducted in the Netherlands.

In their 2015 Annual Report and CSR (Corporate Social Responsibility) Report Boskalis mentions the COP21 climate conference and the Paris Agreement.[12][14] The shipping sector is excluded from the commitments to limit greenhouse gas emissions. Nevertheless, they claim to take their responsibility by also taking initiative to look into ways of reducing their emissions. They focus on the CO2 emissions produced by the fuel consumption of their fleet. In order to reduce the emissions Boskalis is looking into the use of biofuels. In 2015 Boskalis, GoodFuels Marine and Finnish engine manufacturer Wärtsilä, launched a two-year biofuel pilot program. In 2016, Boskalis reports the acquirement of a vessel that partly works on LNG (gas).[13]

In 2018, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) decided that the maritime transport sector should reduce their  CO2 emissions with 50% by 2050 relative to 2008.[15] Boskalis is committed to this target according to their sustainability report.[16] In 2019, they set up a new CO2 reduction target that aims to be climate neutral by 2050 across their global operations (only taking into account Scope 1 and 2).[16] That same year they reported on a ‘major milestone’: one of their hopper dredgers used 100% biofuel oil, made entirely from used cooking oil. Nevertheless, Boskalis believes that biofuels will not be sufficiently available and clean to reach their target and are thus also looking into alternative fuels, like hydrogen and methanol.[16][17]

In 2019, another IMO regulation came into force about the sulfur content in the fuel  for international shipping. Before the limit was 3.5%, but from 2020 on it is set on 0.5%. In 2020, their climate change impact was disclosed through the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) and they got a B- rating. Their previous rating was a D.

Boskalis writes this and more in their sustainability reports. They especially report their milestones regarding sustainability, ongoing projects and new collaborations. They do not write about how they not contribute to a more sustainable world, although they do implicitly write that they are involved in projects in the Arctic. According to Keyzer and Geurts, Boskalis was indeed participating in digging trenches for the pipelines with which Gazprom connects Europe to the world’s largest gas reserves.[18] In the same article it says that arctic operations are risky, for the environment, the safety of workers, and financially. Therefore, companies do not talk much about arctic projects.

Boskalis Netherlands

There is information available about the actions taken by Boskalis Nederland from 2017 on. In that year they signed a five year contract with the firm GoodFuels in order to increase their use of biofuels.[19] There is no mention about subsidies, but according to Joosten[20], the Dutch government is since 2010 granting subsidies for using bio-energy. A big part of the sustainable energy subsidies is spend on bio-energy. In 2018 they started with the implementation of biofuels.[21] In that year they also start with yearly ‘Meet the Buyer’ sessions and they have implemented a course called ‘Het nieuwe draaien’ (The new turning) to increase sustainable behavior among employees. In 2019, Boskalis Nederland reports a reduction of 6.4% of CO2 emissions because of the use of biofuels in their equipment.[22] This is a reduction towards what they would have emitted without the biofuel measures. In 2020, an internal coach regarding sustainable working is appointed.[23] Furthermore, more sustainable machines have been acquired. One of the asphalt plants that Boskalis uses is now completely switched to green energy, which means that all sites used by the Dutch company use green energy. In 2021, the CO2 emissions are increased again by 6%.[24] In the report they state that this is the case because more equipment is employed than the year before.

Since 2011, Boskalis has participated in the CO2 Performance Ladder. The CO2 Performance Ladder is a tool used by Dutch government agencies and businesses to recognize performance in the areas of energy saving, efficient use of materials and renewable energy.[25] Since 2012, they have the highest-level certification for all Boskalis business units in the Netherlands.

Financial Results since 2015

Financial situation
Year Revenue Profit (loss) Dividend
2015[14] 3.240 Billion EUR 0.444 Billion EUR 47.562 Million EUR
2016[26] 2.596 Billion EUR (0.562) Billion EUR 55.762 Million EUR
2017[27] 2.337 Billion EUR 0.150 Billion EUR 29.533 Million EUR
2018[28] 2.57 Billion EUR (0.434) Billion EUR 36.289 Million EUR
2019 [29] 2.645 Billion EUR 0.075 Billion EUR 66.999 Million EUR
2020[30] 2.525 Billion EUR (0.097) Billion EUR -
2021 [2] 2.957 Billion EUR 0.148 Billion EUR 64.819 Million EUR

Current Emissions

Boskalis

In their sustainability reports, Boskalis does not mention anything about the greenhouse gas emissions of Scope 3. Furthermore, they do not show separate numbers for Scope 1 and 2. According to Boskalis, their total Scope 1 and 2 CO2 emissions amounted to 1.08 million tonnes in 2021.[25] The largest part of the CO2 footprint is linked to the vessels. Emissions from the fleet amounted to 1.06 million tonnes.

The reported emissions are from the Offshore Energy division, the Dredging and Inland Infra division and from Offices. They do not include the emissions from the Towage and Salvage division, because the Towage business is incorporated in joint ventures and the Salvage operations rely on vessels from the other divisions or third parties.

Scope 1 & 2 Emissions since 2015
Year Scope 1 & 2
2015[12] 1.521 megatonnes CO2
2016[13] 1.249 megatonnes CO2
2017[31] 1.223 megatonnes CO2
2018[15] 1.180 megatonnes CO2
2019[16] 1.111 megatonnes CO2
2020[17] .984 megatonnes CO2
2021 [25] 1.078 megatonnes CO2

Boskalis Netherlands

Boskalis Nederland does not report any emissions regarding Scope 3. They do have objectives for this scope. See more under Climate plans & policy. Scope 1 includes equipment wet, equipment dry, equipment asphalt, since 2020 equipment transport, and until 2021 equipment CTD. Scope 2 includes the electricity use of company sites, asphalt plants and cleaning plants and the electricity or fuel use by passenger transport.

Scope 1 & 2 Emissions since 2017
Year Scope 1 (tonnes CO2) Scope 2 (tonnes CO2) Total 1 & 2
2017[19] 66,620 1,429 68,050
2018[21] 114,536 1,500 116,036
2019[22] 69,300 1,639 70,939
2020[23] 46,828 288 47,116
2021 (Jan - Juni)[24] 12,737 5,025 17,763

Climate Policy and Plans

Boskalis

In the Annual report of 2019, Boskalis presents their new CO2-reduction target: They aim to be climate neutral by 2050 across their global operations. This target only takes into account Scope 1 and 2, and not 3.[16] In order to do this, they have an Emissions Reduction Taskforce, overseen by a member of the Board of Management.[17] The activities of the Taskforce focus on five distinct areas: Fuel efficiency, new energy sources, carbon offset and credits, trends, regulations and collaboration, and commercial offering. Regarding Scope 3, they claim they start initiatives for emissions reduction where feasible on the basis of impact and influences.

Boskalis Netherlands

Boskalis has specific climate objectives for Boskalis Nederland.[24] These objectives are set with the CO2 Performance Ladder. The main objective concerns Scope 1: By 2025 CO2 emissions caused by fuel consumption by own equipment and passenger transport must be reduced by at least 10 percent compared to the base year 2020. However, Boskalis counts passenger transport to Scope 2 emissions. Then there is an additional objective concerning Scope 2: The CO2 emissions due to electricity consumption by the company buildings, project sites and production sites (asphalt plants and cleaning sites) will be maintained at 0 percent until 2025. Nevertheless, following the reported emissions, it does not seem like the emissions are at 0 for these sites. In this report also additional objectives for Scope 3 are mentioned. There are three plans: In relation to suppliers: Annual dialogue with (a selected group of) suppliers on CO2 reduction in the chain; In relation to subcontractors: By the end of 2025, they want to work with at least one subcontractor in order to reduce the emissions caused by the subcontractor's equipment on our project by 10 percent; and with regard to chain analyses, they have one objective per chain.

NewClimate Institute (NCI) Report

NCI rates Boskalis low on transparency and very low on integrity. [32]

Boskalis is committed to become climate neutral across its operations by 2050. According to NCI, this ambition is undermined in various ways. First of all, this net-zero target only covers scope 1 and 2. Scope 3 is left out, while the scope 3 emissions may be significant. These emissions include for example the upstream production of vessel fuels used. Furthermore, Boskalis installed infrastructure for the transport of oil and gas and these indirect emissions are likely sustantial. Although the GHG Protocol does not require companies to report on indirect emissions, NCI states that by not reporting these emissions, Boskalis can hide fact that is is developing fossil fuel infrastructure. Because Boskalis does not transparently report on its complete GHG footprint, it remains unclear what share of emissions are covered by this climate neutral target.

The net-zero ambition may be further undermined by the reliance on contentious renewable energy certificates. Boskalis purchases electricity with Dutch Biomass NTA 8080 certifications. These certifications are used to demonstrate that biomass used for energy generations meets certain sustainability criteria. The use of such certifications does not have impact on additional renewable electricity capacity and does not prevent other consumers to use carbon intensive electricity.

Moreover, Boskalis states to "actively investigate sustainable options for offsetting emissions"[33] which suggests that the company, in order to achieve it net-zero target, plans to offset an undefined amount of emissions. However, it does not confirm this, nor does it giving any other information regarding offsetting.

Lastly, the range of emission reducing measures that Boskalis pursues, lack information and therefore, their potential mitigation impact cannot be fully examined.

Scandals and controversies

2006 - 2007 Mauritius

In 2006 and 2007, Boskalis made six payments to the former port director of Mauritius, Siddick Chady.[34][35] This was done in order to acquire dredging contracts in Port Louis. A total of nearly 89 thousand euros in bribes were transferred to his bank accounts in Singapore and the UK. In May 2013, Boskalis made a full confession of guilt before a court in Mauritius.

2011 - 2017 Poland

In the shipyard of company Stocznia in the Polish city of Police, North Koreans have been employed through human trafficking since the beginning of 2011 until the end of 2017.[36] Different Dutch shipbuilders, including Boskalis, had at least 33 ships made at the yard. The North Koreans who worked at the shipyard were paid little or nothing for their work. The North Koreans were recruited by the regime with the promise of high wages and higher status. They made days of twelve hours or longer and received little leave. Boskalis confirmed that 'four identical hulls' had been taken from the Partner shipyard, which were further finished in the Netherlands into full-sized vessels. According to a spokesperson, Boskalis was not aware that North Korean forced laborers were working there.

Due Diligence

Russia

Boskalis has helped with building Nord Stream I and Turkstream, pipelines with wich Russia exports gas to European countries.[37]

2020 Indonesia

Boskalis was working near the city of Makassar, on the Island of Sulawesi, to expand the port.[38] Dredgers take sand from the sea, and deposit it miles away. Off the coast of the Indonesian island, dozens of fishermen protested against Boskalis' dredging activities for weeks. Because of the dredging activity, the fish population drops and the water is clouded. Locals said they were losing income and feared longer-term damage. Boskalis stated that the fishermen have been informed of the dredging project and are being financially compensated. However, the fishermen did not seem to know anything of this.

2012 - 2020 Kenya

From August 2012 till August 2013, Boskalis International B.V. was a sub-contractor of the Japanese company Toyo Construction in the project of expanding the Port of Mombasa in Kenya.[39] According to Roodenburg and Sonderen,[40] the contractor was a Chinese company. This project was conducted in phases, and from 2012 till 2013 the first phase took place. For the complete project some fifteen million cubic meters of sand was needed. This sand was partly taken from Diani. The coastline of Diani belongs to a nature reserve and removing sand disrupts the ecosystem. According to Boskalis, an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and an Environmental Monitoring Management Plan (EMMP) were prepared and local environmental regulations and restrictions were met throughout the project. However, as Roodenburg and Sonderen write, the EIA had many flaws. Residents of Diani disputed the EIA and then quickly new attachments were brought in. Furthermore, there had hardly been any discussion with residents, tour operators and fishermen. And there was no recent research into the condition of marine life, the coastline and the impact on fishing. The residents' association started a lawsuit against the contractor company. In 2016, when all the sand for the first phase of the harbor project had been removed from Diani, the judge concluded: The dredging company should indeed not have been allowed to extract sand from the nature reserve. The fishermen are compensated with about sixteen thousand dollars. They had to divide that among themselves. The money has not arrived yet.

According to Roodenburg and Sonderen, in March 2019, the second phase starts, this time with the Japanese company. Boskalis again extracts sand off the coast of Diani. There is no mention of this on Boskalis’ website. In order to circumvent a ruling like the one in the previous court case, this time the sand is being taken off the Waa and Tiwi coastal strips, along Diani's outer borders. Both are just short of being nature reserves. During sand extraction, sand that is too finely extracted flows back into the ocean, just off the coast, where it partly ends up on top of the coral. The sand blocks the light, which can cause the coral to suffocate. Without the coral reef, the waves would hit the coast much harder and swallow up the beaches of Diani. After protests from the residents, Boskalis suggests to the port authorities and Toyo that they sail in a large loop instead of parallel to the coast, so that the fine sand no longer lands on the vulnerable corals, but a lot further away. The inhabitants of Diani are fortunate in that they have the power and resources to initiate legal proceedings and carry out scientific research at their own expense. For many vulnerable communities in other places, this is not the case.

2022 Philippines

At the end of 2020, Boskalis was awarded a contract for the land development of the new Manila International Airport, a project of more than 1.5 billion euro.[41] Because it is a huge and risky project, Boskalis asked for a export credit insurance of the Dutch state via Atradius DSB. On the 24th of May, 2022, it was decided that this export credit insurance was accepted.[41][42] Before, a coalition of Filipino and Dutch civil society organizations and scientists had asked the Dutch state to withdraw from this project.[43] According to the coalition, the bay of Manilla is very vulnerable to climate change. The project that Boskalis was awarded will only put more pressure on this area, resulting in more flooding and impacting sea life. Wetlands that are crucial for CO2 storage and that house many unique animals will be destroyed. Furthermore, people were pressured to destroy their homes to make place for the project and fishermen will not have access to the fishing grounds, of which they are dependent for their subsistence. Boskalis is presented as a key figure for climate adaptation and to thus make communities and ecosystems more resilient. However, according to the coalition, with the Manila Airport this is not the case. Also, critical questions were asked by the Partij voor de Dieren to the deputy minister of Finances about the export credit insurance.[42] Nevertheless, the export credit insurance was accepted by the deputy minister.

Conclusion

Boskalis is one of the biggest companies in the dredging industry, involved in many projects all around the world. Sustainability appears to be important to Boskalis and Boskalis is thus involved in many technologically advanced projects, is committed to CO2 reduction targets, and participates in various benchmark surveys that monitor sustainability performance. At first sight, it thus seems as if Boskalis takes climate change seriously. It also seems to comply with the ambitions and rules of other organizations and institutions. However, there are no clear ambitions regarding Scope 3. In addition, there are no intermediary ambitions known for the main ambition of Boskalis to become climate neutral regarding Scope 1 and 2 in 2050. It will thus be difficult to determine in the coming years whether Boskalis is on track to achieve its ambition. The target therefore does not look realistic. Furthermore, sustainability seems to be especially of importance for projects taking place in the Netherlands and other North-West European countries. Moreover, they repeatedly state that all stakeholder are taken into account when executing a project, but this does not seem to be the case as examples have shown.

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